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# TWO VIEWS ON SALT

*The debate over SALT II is being led by two former government officials with wide experience in defense and arms control. Paul Nitze, 72, is a former Secretary of the Navy and an outspoken opponent of the accord. Paul Warnke, 59, was, until recently, President Carter's chief arms-control negotiator and vigorously defends the treaty he helped to draft. The two men were interviewed separately in Washington last week by* NEWSWEEK'S *John J. Lindsay. Excerpts:*

**LINDSAY:** ***How does SALT II help or hurt our national security?***

**NITZE:** There are two questions involved.

**Warnke: 'Without SALT, there would be a premium on striking first'**

The first one is whether . . . the ceilings in SALT II are too high. I believe they are *much* too high and that the SALT II treaty has really very little to do with arms control. The second question is whether . . . the provisions of the treaty are equal as between the two sides. They are not equal. One should also take into account the relative *size* of warheads. Soviet warheads on some of their SS-18s have 625 times the yield of warheads on our Poseidon missiles.

But that isn't the main point. The main point is the question of accuracy and reliability coupled with size. The Soviet Union's capability will increase tenfold by the end of the treaty and will be substantially greater than that of the U.S. This is the thing that is really worrisome.

**WARNKE:** I think you have to recognize that security in the sense of safety from nuclear war depends upon strategic stability . . . The real problem in the absence of SALT II is that you may end up with technological breakthroughs that would, in fact, threaten the ability of the other side to retaliate. That would eliminate the deterrent; it would mean that as a consequence, in a time of crisis, a premium would be put on striking first.

***Q. What changes would you like to see made in the treaty?***

**NITZE:** The thing that really should have been limited—should have been banned—is the modern, large ballistic missiles . . . The Soviets are building some 300 very large missiles with seven times the power of our Minuteman II, our largest MIRVed missile. As the treaty has worked out, the Soviet Union is permitted 300 of them. We are permitted none. I think the treaty would be improved if it provided that both sides were entitled to the same number and that the number were as close to zero as the Soviet Union would accept.

I think the treaty will prevent our doing what is necessary to defend ourselves against those modern, large ballistic missiles. That is, to deploy our Minutemen in a new basing mode. This is sometimes called "the shell game." In essence, what it provides is a large number of fixed ICBM silos for each one of our missiles. I believe the treaty's language now prohibits the deployment of fixed ICBM silos. The Senate should see to it that the executive branch clarifies this point [so that] we could, under the treaty, deploy our ICBM's in that way.

**WARNKE:** The treaty is more than adequate at the present time. Now certain changes can obviously be made if the Senate were to insist on relaxation of some of the controls, so that both we and the Soviets would be able to go ahead with more systems. I'm sure the Soviets would accept that weakening of the treaty. But I doubt that is what the senators would like to do.

***Q. Would the Soviet Union accept any change mandated by the Senate?***

**NITZE:** I'm not sure that they would [accept my proposal on large MIRV's]. But I see nothing unfair in their accepting it.

**WARNKE:** Well, it depends on what the senators do. If they try and get the Soviets to make further concessions, in addition to those they have already made, I think they will find that they've got a dry well. The Soviets have been pushed as far as they are going to be pushed. The major moves have been made by the Soviets toward the American positions consistently over the years of the SALT II negotiations.

***Q. The SALT II treaty does not provide for on-site verification. In view of U.S. weaknesses in verifying compliance, should, ironically, on-site inspection be added to the treaty?***

**NITZE:** On-site inspection would not be very effective . . . You could have somebody looking at a missile, and unless he had a screwdriver and could take the missile apart, he could not know how many warheads there were. And even if he were given the opportunity to take it apart and count the re-entry vehicles, he couldn't be sure that six hours later they hadn't unscrewed that warhead and put a different one on.

**WARNKE:** On-site inspection would be of no use in the SALT II treaty.

***Q. If the Senate rejects SALT II, what will be the impact on détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?***

**Nitze: 'Soviet capacity will increase tenfold by the treaty's end'**

**NITZE:** The Soviet leaders respect people of strength of character, wisdom and strength . . . I do not believe that the way to improve one's relations with the Soviets is to enter into arrangements that are one-sided in their favor.

**WARNKE:** Obviously the Soviets would figure that we had [turned] away from any attempt at accommodation. After all, they have been negotiating now with three presidents—two Republican, one Democratic—over a period of almost ten years. If at the end of that negotiating process there is disapproval of the treaty, they'd be bound to wonder just what American foreign policy was.

***Q. If SALT II is rejected, how will the arms race—and efforts to control it—be affected?***

**NITZE:** I think the probability is that the Soviet defense program—and particularly

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that portion of it dealing with strategic nuclear weapons—will be about the same whether SALT II is ratified or not.

If we go forward with a program to reverse current trends, I would think that after the Soviets are persuaded that we can and will effectively deny them strategic nuclear superiority, we can anticipate the eventual renewal of SALT negotiations on quite a different basis. One could seek parity and provisions that would, in fact, reduce the risk of nuclear war and which would decrease crisis and instability.

**WARNKE:** The Soviets would go ahead with their present program, which would mean a whole fifth generation of ICBM's. Conservative estimates are that they would increase their total number of strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles from the present 2,550 to some 3,000. We have slightly more than 2,000. So as a consequence, we'd be faced with a 50 per cent disparity.

With regard to their large ICBM's, they could load them up with more and more warheads, which would increase our concerns about the survivability of our ICBM's.

Also, without SALT, they'd be free to conceal; they'd be free to interfere with our national technical means of verification. We'd have to guess what they were doing; they'd have to guess what we were doing. We'd both guess high, and the arms race would be in for further escalation.

And without the successful completion of SALT, you couldn't move ahead with any of the other arms-control negotiations.

***Q. Should Soviet behavior in places like Africa or its behavior on human rights be "linked" to the SALT treaty?***

**NITZE:** What the Soviet Union has done in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, over the last five years [has] hardly been favorable to our side. [But] at the signing of SALT I, President Nixon attempted to get Leonid Brezhnev to agree that we would go beyond the words of the treaty and try to implement the "spirit of the treaty" as well. The Soviets didn't understand what "spirit of the treaty" meant; they had negotiated hard for individual provisions and we should not count on them to do anything other than abide by the strict terms of the treaty. Frankly, I don't disagree with that viewpoint.

**WARNKE:** I think that the fallacy of the direct-linkage argument can be seen when you look at the significance of the SALT treaty. We certainly would not give them any concessions in SALT to bribe them into being good someplace else. And we can't take SALT away from them as punishment for their behavior, because it is not a favor we are doing for them. It is a favor we are doing for ourselves, for our own security. The purpose of arms control is to try to diminish the risk of the inevitable competition that will continue between two countries that have so many differences.